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Civil Rights and Human Rights: A Call for
Closer Collaboration

By Douglass Cassel

[Editor's note: This articleis adaptedfrom
the author's remarks on July 19, 2000,
before the annualmeeting of the Chicago
Lauyers' Committeefor Civil Rights Under
Law Inc.]
If rights are to enjoy effective protection,
experience worldwide teaches that, more
than the laws on the books, what counts
is affordable access by victims to capable lawyers committed to enforcing their
rights. Human rights would be far more
secure if we could clone the Chicago
Lawyers' Committee in, say, ten strategically located cities around the globe.
Those of you who may be familiar
with my commentaries know that my
usual topics are mass murderers overseas
or U.S. foreign policy toward them.
Today, however, I would like to focus
on something closer to home-the history of and prospects for fruitful collaboration between the civil rights movement and the international human rights
movement. My purpose is to encourage
dialogue between civil rights and human
rights lawyers. As a sometime civil rights
lawyer myself, I am convinced that such
Douglass Cassel is director,
Center for International Human a dialogue could be productive.
Rights, Northwestern University
We might start by distinguishing
School of Law, 357 E. Chicago human rights from civil rights. In cusAve., Chicago, IL 60611;
tomary American usage, the difference is
simple enough: human rights are for
312.503.2224;
other countries; civil rights are for us.
d-cassel@nwu.edu.
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Jurisprudentially, of course, the difference is more profound. Civil rights are
granted to members of a society by its
laws. They can expand or contract with
congressional majorities. In contrast,
human rights do not derive from positive
law and are not limited to the members
of a polity. They are inherent in the
human person; we are all born with
them. Laws and governments can neither
grant nor take them away but can only
recognize them-or fail to do so. Civil
rights may vary with national laws, but
human rights are universal.
If that sounds like a theory of natural rights, it is. Natural rights are controversial. Who is to say what they are? On
what authority, by what methodology?
Personally I am not haunted by such
questions. My gut tells me that some
rights are so innate that no law can take
them away. Even if Hitler had decreed
the Final Solution through all the forms of
law, that would not have made it legal
in my book.
In practice, fortunately, we need not
be diverted by such theoretical debates.
Nowadays human rights are recognized
almost everywhere in positive lawspecifically in a dozen major global and
regional treaties developed in the last half
century and now ratified by most countries. Collectively they constitute the basic
content of contemporary international
human rights law.
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Broad international legal recognition
In his 1944 message FDR called for a
of human rights is surprisingly recent. "Second Bill of Rights under which a new
Almost none of it existed before my first basis of security and prosperity can be
daughter was born 22 years ago. In law established for all-regardless of station,
school some 30 years ago, I studied civil race or creed." He advocated, among othrights, but not human rights. Circa 1970 ers, the right to a useful and remunerative
I thought human rights were more the job; the right to earn enough to provide
province of divinity schools than law adequate food and clothing and recreschools, and at the time I was right.
ation; the right of every family to a decent
But even then, some people could home; the right to adequate medical care;
see a different day dawning. I have never the right to adequate protection from the
forgotten a job interview I had in 1972 economic fears of old age, sickness, acciwith Jack Greenberg of the National dent, and unemployment; and the right to
Association for the Advancement of a good education.
Colored People Legal Defense Fund. As
The following year, at the founding
you may know, Greenberg had partici- conference of the United Nations in San
pated in practically every major U.S. Francisco, calls were made for an interSupreme Court civil rights case since national bill of rights, one that would entiBrown v. Board.1 I asked him, If he had tle all people everywhere both to the
it to do all over again, would he do any- kinds of rights in the original American
thing different? "Yes," he answered to my Bill of Rights and to those in Roosevelt's
astonishment, "I'd go into international Second Bill of Rights.
human rights law."
Among the leading agitators for
By that time the international human human rights in San Francisco were leadrights movement had already been dawn- ers of groups like the NAACP, the Amering for about 30 years. At its beginning ican Federation of Labor, the American
Americans were in the forefront. One key Jewish Committee, the National Catholic
harbinger was a 1941 congressional ad- Welfare Conference, and the American
dress, widely publicized around the Association of University Women, among
world, by Franklin Delano Roosevelt. many others. For such groups-who
"We look forward," said Roosevelt, "to a were or would become important memworld founded upon four essential bers of the incipient civil rights movehuman freedoms[:... freedom of speech ment-the unity of interest between interand expression... freedom of every per- national human rights and domestic civil
son to worship God in his own way...
rights required no explanation.
freedom from want ... [and] freedom
They did not immediately succeed.
from fear ......
The U.N. Charter did not contain a bill
Three years later, in his 1944 mes- of rights. But it did commit the United
sage to Congress, Roosevelt expanded on Nations to work for "human rights and
these thoughts. "True individual freedom," for fundamental freedoms for all without
he declared, "cannot exist without eco- distinction as to race, sex, language or
nomic security and independence. 'Neces- religion; .. . ." When one recalls that the
sitous men are not freemen.' People who world of 1945 consisted largely of coloare hungry and out of a job are the stuff nialism and communism abroad, and Jim
of which dictatorships are made."
Crow at home, this was a revolutionary
This was no casual philosophizing. proposition.
FDR's generation saw the economic
In closing the San Francisco conferchaos of the Weimar Republic descend ence, President Harry Truman called for
into the political psychosis of the Third building on this statement of principle by
Reich. In our own time the linkage adopting an international bill of rights as
between economic and political rights is one of the first orders of business of the
evident again in countries from Ven- United Nations. It was not long in comezuela to Algeria to Russia.
ing. In 1946 Eleanor Roosevelt became
1Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the first chair of the newly established
U.N. Human Rights Commission. After
two years of drafting by her commission
and lengthy debate in the General
Assembly, the United Nations in 1948
adopted the world's first 2Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
The Universal Declaration would
have made FDR proud; it proclaims nearly every right both in the original
American Bill of Rights and in his Second
Bill of Rights. But it does not purport to
create them, merely to recognize them
as preexisting. The very first article of the
Universal Declaration proclaims, "All
human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights."
Nor does it proclaim a narrow or selfish vision of rights divorced from responsibility. Article I continues: "They are
endowed with reason and conscience
and should act toward one another in a
spirit of brotherhood."
By 1948, however, American support
for international human rights was
already' in jeopardy. The American Bar
Association, for example, asked for a
delay in the adoption of the Universal
Declaration; the American Bar Association
president issued dire warnings of the
threats it allegedly posed to the sovereign rights of states. The State Department instructed Mrs. Roosevelt to tell the
U.N. General Assembly that the United
States did not consider the Universal
Declaration to be legally binding but
merely an aspirational statement.
What happened to put on the brakes
in Washington?
One factor was race. After all 1948
was still six years before the Supreme

Court's decision in Brown v. Board.3 In
1947, under the leadership of Dr. W.E.B.
Dubois, the NAACP filed with the United
Nations a lengthy petition challenging
racial discrimination against the Negro
people of the United States as a violation
of the U.N. Charter. In Oyama v.
California in early 1948 four justices of
the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that
California land laws, discriminating
against persons of Japanese ancestry, violated not only the U.S. Constitution but
also the U.N. Charter, a treaty to which
the United States is a party, and which is
part of the supreme law of the 4land under
Article VI of the Constitution.
The specter of U.N. interference with
American racial law and policy provoked
opposition not only by racists but also
among their allies who believed that such
matters were for Americans, not foreigners, to decide. The historical strands of
isolationism in our polity were thus a second source of American resistance to
international human rights. For "America
Firsters," the very concept of human
rights is, well, un-American.
A third source of opposition was the
cold war. The Soviet Union and its allies
were members of the United Nations.
Their delegates sat on the U.N. Human
Rights Commission. 5 Their judges sat on
the United Nations' judicial organ, the
International Court of Justice, or World
Court. 6 Might they not use these posts to
embarrass the United States by condemning our racial discrimination as violations of human rights?
All this led by the early 1950s to a proposed constitutional amendment whose
lead sponsor was Ohio Senator John

2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A)(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71
(1948).
3 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
4
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force, Oct. 24, 1945; U.S. CONST.
art. VI: "[Aill treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary nothwithstanding. "
5 The U.N. Human Rights Commission, may be reached at OHCHR-UNOG, 8-14 Avenue
de la Paix, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. Extensive information is available on the U.N.
High Commission for Human Rights' Web site, www.unhchr.ch.
6 International Court of Justice, Peace Palace, 2517 KJ, The Hague, Netherlands; see the
Court's Web site, www.icj-cij.org.
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Bricker. The Bricker amendment would
have severely hampered American ability
to participate in treaties. 7 For example, it
would have turned the Supremacy Clause
upside down, so that states' rights under
the Tenth Amendment would have
trumped the federal government's authority under treaties. In order to defeat it,
President Dwight D. Eisenhower had
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
promise the Senate not to worry-the
United States simply would not join any
international human rights treaties.
There matters rested for a quarter of
a century. American racial segregation
would be challenged successfully but
only as a violation of civil rights, not
human rights. The legal engines of racial
progress in America were to be reinterpretations of the Constitution and the passage of new civil rights laws, not appeals
to the United Nations or to treaties. Civil
rights laws and their constituency became
functionally disconnected from international human rights.
By the time Jimmy Carter became the
"human rights president," issues of legalized race discrimination in America had
diminished. But not even he could break
through the cold war ice. Carter signed
several human rights treaties but could
not get the Senate to consent to their ratification. 8 Worse yet, in his failing effort
to secure Senate approval, he adopted
three approaches which were selfdestructive of American participation in
human rights treaties and which have
now set an unfortunate precedent.

First, he agreed to ratify human rights
treaties only to the extent that they were
consistent with preexisting American law.
Consider what would happen if every
country took such an approach. There
would be no international human rights
law, only a patchwork of different national versions.
Second, he ruled out effective international enforcement. America would ratify treaties but would not accept individual complaint procedures before U.N.
human rights monitoring committees,
much less submit to the jurisdiction of
international courts in human rights cases.
And, third, Carter also ruled out
domestic enforcement by declaring that
the treaties were not "self-executing," that
is, they could not serve as the basis for a
cause of action in American courts.
With such constraints, asked the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in
New York, why bother? Imagine how we
would react if the Chinese or Fidel Castro
purported to ratify human rights treaties
subject to such restrictions. We would
not be deceived by their cynical gestures.
Now reflect on how the rest of the world
reacted when they learned of Carter's
proposals.
Yet Carter's proposals are now the
law of the land. Under Presidents Ronald
Reagan, George Bush, and Carter the
United States ratified four major human
rights treaties. 9 Reagan first got the United
States to ratify the Convention Against
Genocide in 1988-only 40 years after it
had been adopted by the United Nations.

7 Sen. John Bricker actually introduced a series of similar proposed amendments over a

period of years. See generally Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition
to Human Rights Treaties in the United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker
Amendment, 10 HUM. RTs. Q. 309 (1988).
8
Pres. Jimmy Carter signed and sent to the Senate the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the
American Convention on Human Rights; and the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. Messagefrom the President of the
United States Transmitting Four Treaties Pertainingto Human Rights, Senate exhibits
C-F, 95th Congress, 2d Sess. (Feb. 23, 1978).
9 Convention Against Genocide in 1988, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered into force, Dec. 9, 1948; the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316(1966), 999 U.N.T.S 171, entered into
force, March 23, 1976; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51(1984), entered into force, June 26 1987; and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, entered intoforce, Jan. 4, 1969.
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Next came Bush in 1992 with the single
most comprehensive treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 10 But Bush saddled U.S. ratification of the Covenant with Carter's three
hobbling restrictions.
In 1994 the Clinton administration
secured ratification of U.N. treaties against
11
torture and against race discrimination.
But still the United States was held back
by the legacy of American hostility to
international human rights standards

One can understand and even share the concerns ofJustice and State Department officials
over the political impact of an adverse international court ruling on a sensitive domestic political issue. But Britain, France, Germany, Italy,
andArgentina, to name only afew, have all
accepted internationaljurisdiction and survived
adverse rulings in sensitive cases. What makes
the United States so special?
(except for other countries) and by the
wedge driven between the civil rights and
human rights movements.
One example of this emerged in a
1993 meeting between officials of the
Justice and State Departments. Presiding
was the new chief of the Civil Rights
Division of the Justice Department-a
highly respected civil rights lawyer. The
administration was prepared to ratify the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 12 The issue was whether we would
accept the treaty's dispute resolution provision, by which disputes between State
parties regarding the interpretation or
application of the treaty could be referred
to the International Court of Justice.
There was some reason to hope that
the United States might at long last submit to the international rule of law in

human rights cases, as nearly all other
democracies in the world had already
done. The cold war was over; no longer
were communist countries represented
on the World Court. Racial discrimination
was now illegal in the United States, too.
But, after extended debate, the group
decided to reject World Court jurisdiction
over U.S. race discrimination. The group
was worried about racial disparities in
the imposition of the death penalty. The
Supreme Court had declined to find disparate impact, without proof of discriminatory intent, to be unconstitutional. But
how might the World Court interpret the
treaty?
One can understand and even share
their concerns over the political impact
of an adverse international court ruling
on a sensitive domestic political issue.
But Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and
Argentina, to name only a few, have all
accepted international jurisdiction and
survived adverse rulings in sensitive
cases. What makes the United States so
special?
Moreover, what message does the
American boycott send to the rest of the
world? Does it not provide cover for
Peru's Alberto Fujimori and Zimbabwe's
Robert Mugabe and other authoritarian
rulers who are delighted to cite the home
of the free as precedent for not submit13
ting to international human rights law?
That 1993 meeting came during
Clinton's first term, the high point of U.S.
rapprochement with human rights
treaties. In 1994 the Senate went Republican, and Jesse Helms became chair of
the Foreign Relations Committee. Since
then the Convention on Discrimination
Against Women has been frozen in committee. We remain one of only two countries on the planet that have not joined
the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child. The other is Somalia, which has
no government.
From the point of view of American
civil rights, one might ask whether this

10 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 9.
Id.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 9.
13 As of this writing, Alberto Fujimori is president of Peru and Robert Mugabe is president
of Zimbabwe.
12
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matters. After all, domestic American law
is more protective of rights than international law, is it not?
Not always. For example, international law places greater restrictions on
the death penalty. Unlike the U.S.
Supreme Court, international law prohibits capital punishment for those aged
16 or 17 at the time of the crime. It
arguably requires higher standards of
death penalty defense counsel and is less
prone to waive rights based on procedural default. In some circumstances
international law prohibits the more
extreme and prolonged forms of the
"death row phenomenon." It may well
prohibit extreme racial disparities in the
imposition of the death penalty, even
without proof of discriminatory intent.
International law may also be more
protective of prisoners' rights than is
American law. Whereas we prohibit only
punishment that is cruel and unusual, and
some Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that these requirements may be conjunctive, international law prohibits punishments or treatment that are cruel,
inhuman, or degrading. Sexual harassment of prisoners that does not cause
serious physical injury, for example, may
not always violate American rights, but it
violates international rights. Invasions of
prisoner privacy-for example, male
guards observing female prisoners shower-may not violate American law, but it
violates international law.
Gay rights are another example. The
Burger Court ruled in Bowers v. Hardwick
that state sodomy laws, criminalizing pri-

vate, consenting relations between adults,
are constitutional.14 Recently a Louisiana
court reached a similar result. 15 By contrast, at almost the same time as Bowers,
the European Court of Human Rights
ruled that such laws violated the human
right to privacy. 16 The U.N. Human Rights

Committee has since found them to be
discriminatory as well.17
Juvenile rights are a further example.
International law requires that juvenile
offenders be segregated from adults and
be accorded treatment appropriate to
their age and legal status. 18 Is that standard presently met in Cook County?
I could go on with further examples,
but one might ask, so what? If the United
States declares human rights treaties to
be non-self-executing, are they not unenforceable in our courts?
Not necessarily. There may be a variety of ways to get mileage from human
rights treaties even if they do not directly
provide a cause of action. Statutes may be
adopted to implement them. One may
argue that they are "laws" for purposes of
section 1983 civil rights suits or the general federal jurisdictional statute. They may
be used to assist in interpretation of U.S.
law. Since the Supreme Court's decision in
The CharmingBetsy in 1804, U.S. jurisprudence has provided that whenever a law
of the United States can be interpreted in
a manner consistent with the law of
nations, it must be so interpreted. 19
International human rights law can
also be used in the advocacy of public
policy and in legislative drafting. It can be
incorporated in administrative regulations
as, for example, some U.S. prison systems incorporate the U.N. minimum
prison standards.
The opportunities are there. Pursuing
them will be no easier, and no more likely to yield immediate victories, than was
the civil rights litigation strategy devised
long ago by Thurgood Marshall. But, in
the long run, reconciling civil rights with
human rights may not only strengthen
rights protection here at home but also
enable this democracy to play a more
credible and constructive role in protecting rights in other countries.

14 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
15
Louisiana v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501 (La. Sup. Ct. 2000).
16 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), 4 E.H.H. R. 149 (1981).
17
Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Human Rights Comm'n 1994).
18 E.g., articles 10.2(b) and 10.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 9.
19 The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 34, 67, 2 L. Ed. 208 (1804) (opinion for the Court
by Chief Justice Marshall).
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER

2000

1 JOURNAL OF POVERTY LAW AND POLICY

